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MŌRI V. JAPAN: THE NAGOYA HIGH COURT
RECOGNIZES THE RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE
Translated by Hudson Hamilton†
Translator’s note: The following is a translation of the Nagoya High Court’s
decision in Mōri v. Japan,1 a case challenging the constitutionality of Japan’s deployment
of its Self-Defense Forces (“SDF”) to the Middle East in connection with the United
States-led occupation of Iraq. Beginning in December of 2003, Japan deployed ground
and air forces of the SDF to the Middle East, including three C-130H “Hercules”
transport aircraft which were used to airlift coalition forces and supplies between Kuwait
and Baghdad.2 In response, more than 5,700 citizens, represented by over 800 attorneys,
filed lawsuits in eleven district courts across the country in one of the largest coordinated
litigation efforts in modern Japanese history. 3 In Mōri, the plaintiffs argued that the
deployment violated their “right to live in peace” [heiwateki seizonken],4 provided in the
Preamble of the Constitution of Japan,5 which they defined as “the right to live in a Japan
that does not engage in war or the use of military force.”6 They also argued that the
deployment violated Article 9 of the Constitution, which renounces war and prohibits the
use or threat of force. 7 They demanded an injunction against the deployment, a

†

Juris Doctor candidate, University of Washington School of Law, expected 2011.
Mōri v. Japan, (Nagoya High Ct., April 27, 2008) (unpublished decision),
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20080428151610.pdf (last visited May 23, 2010) [hereinafter “Nagoya
HC”]. Mōri v. Japan is reprinted in MŌRI MASAMICHI, HEIWATEKI SEIZONKEN TO SEIZONKEN GA
TSUNAGARU HI [The Day when the Right to Live in Peace and the Right to Life Connect] 195 (2009).
Pinpoint citations are to page numbers in the PDF document.
2
Nagoya HC, supra note 1, at 2, 20. See infra Part II(2)(3), Part III(2)(3) (fourth paragraph,
discussing C-130H transport aircraft).
3
MŌRI MASAMICHI, supra note 1, at 12. See generally Jieitai Iraku Hahei Sashidome Soshō
Zenkoku Bengodan Renrakukai [SDF Iraq Deployment Injunction Lawsuit National Attorney Network],
http://www.stop-iraqwar.net/activity/index.html (last visited May 23, 2010). Coordinated protest litigation
has existed in Japan for decades, and has been used to address such social problems as industrial pollution,
discrimination against minorities, discrimination against women in the workplace, industrial policy, and
AIDS policy. See FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987); ERIC A.
FELDMAN, THE RITUAL OF RIGHTS IN JAPAN (2000).
4
The Japanese term heiwateki seizonken [literally “the right to a peaceful existence”] is shorthand
for heiwa no uchi ni seizon suru kenri [the right to live in peace], which appears in the second paragraph of
the Preamble of the Constitution of Japan. There is no difference in meaning between the two terms, and
both translate to “the right to live in peace.” For a detailed account of the right to live in peace in Japan,
see KOBAYASHI TAKESHI, HEIWATEKI SEIZONKEN NO BENSHŌ [Argument for the Right to Live in Peace]
(2006).
5
The second paragraph of the Preamble of the Constitution of Japan reads in relevant part: “We, the
Japanese people, . . . recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear
and want.” KENPŌ, pmbl.
6
Nagoya HC, supra note 1, at 50.
7
Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan reads in full: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace
based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and
the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as
other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”
KENPŌ, art. 9.
1
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confirmation that the deployment was unconstitutional, and ¥10,000 each (approx.
US$100) in damages.
The case turned on whether the right to live in peace is a “concrete right” [gutaiteki
kenri], meaning a right that can be enforced in court. The plaintiffs argued that the
Preamble, Article 9, and the individual rights provided in Chapter III of the Constitution
together guarantee the right to live in peace.8 The government argued that the right to
live in peace is merely an abstract concept, not an enforceable right, and therefore the
plaintiffs lacked a legal interest in the lawsuit necessary to establish standing.9
The Nagoya District Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing and dismissed the
case without addressing the constitutionality of the deployment under Article 9. 10
However, the district court recognized a concrete aspect of the right to live in peace,
reasoning that because peace is the foundation of all human rights making their
enjoyment possible, the right to live in peace is enforceable when combined with other
human rights provisions.11
The Nagoya High Court affirmed the district court and dismissed the appeal on
standing grounds, holding that the deployment did not infringe on appellants’ right to live
in peace.12 However, the high court stated in dicta that, in certain situations, the right to
live in peace is a concrete right.13 The high court also stated that the integration of the
SDF’s air transport activities with the use of force by coalition forces in an international
military conflict constituted the use of force by the SDF in violation of Article 9.14 The
Nagoya High Court’s finding of a violation of Article 9 was the first since the Sapporo
District Court’s decision in the Naganuma case thirty-five years before,15 and the first to
be entered as a final judgment.16 The high court’s recognition of the right to live in peace

8

Nagoya HC, supra note 1, at 47.
Id. at 56-59. The government cited the Supreme Court’s decision in the Hyakuri case, another
case challenging the constitutionality of an act of the SDF under Article 9 and the right to live in peace,
which held that “the peace asserted by appellants as pacifism and the right to live in peace is an abstract
concept of an idea and goal, and does not arise independently as a standard for judging the validity of an act
under private law in a concrete case.” Ishizuka v. Japan, 43(6) MINSHŪ 385, 393, 1318 HANREI JIHŌ 3, 8
(Sup. Ct., June 20, 1989) (unofficial translation by author) (last visited May 23, 2010),
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/385CF7A2BB2800F249256AC300058EF4.pdf,
translated
in
LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990, at
130, 135 (1996).
10
[Tajika Decision], 1997 HANREI JIHŌ 93, 97 (Nagoya Dist. Ct., Mar. 23, 2007) [hereinafter
“Nagoya DC”]. See Nakatani Yūji, Heiwateki Seizonken no Gutaiteki Kenrisei wo Mitometa Nagoya
Dainanaji Soshō Hanketsu [Decision of the Seventh Nagoya Hearing Recognizing the Right to Live in
Peace as a Concrete Right] 638 HŌGAKU SEMINA 44 (2008) (commenting on the Tajika decision).
11
Nagoya DC, supra note 10, at 97.
12
Nagoya HC, supra note 1, at 23-25. See infra Parts III(4)-IV.
13
Id. at 22. See infra Part III(3) (last line of the second paragraph).
14
Id. at 21. See infra Part II(2)(4).
15
See Itō v. Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, 712 HANREI JIHŌ 24 (Sapporo Dist. Ct., Sept. 7,
1973) [hereinafter “Naganuma DC”], translated in BEER & ITOH, supra note 9, at 83 (holding that the SDF
constituted land, sea, and air forces in violation of Article 9(2)), rev’d, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry
v. Itō, 27(8) GYŌSAI REISHŪ 1175, 821 HANREI JIHŌ 21 (Sapporo High Ct., Aug. 5, 1976), translated in
BEER & ITOH, supra note 9, at 112.
16
The appellants did not appeal the decision, and the government was unable to appeal because it
won the case. However, because the case was dismissed, the decision was not binding against the
government. See Kobayashi Takeshi, Jieitai Iraku Hahei Iken: Nagoya Kōsai Hanketsu no Igi
[Unconstitutionality of the Iraq Deployment: The Significance of the Nagoya High Court Decision], 80(8)
HŌRITSU JIHŌ 1 (2008).
9
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was also the first since Naganuma,17 breaking from a series of lower court decisions that
dismissed the right to live in peace as merely an abstract concept.18 Less than a year later,
the Okayama District Court followed the Nagoya High Court in recognizing the right to
live in peace in a similar SDF Iraq Deployment case, and provided further detail
regarding the right’s substance. 19 The Nagoya and Okayama decisions suggest the
emergence (or revival) of a new human right in Japan: the right to live in peace.

Case Number: Heisei 19 (Ne) 58
Title: Appeal Requesting Injunction Against the Deployment of the SelfDefense Forces to Iraq
Date of Decision: April 17, 2008
Court: Nagoya High Court, Third Civil Division
JUDGMENT
1. All claims are dismissed.
2. Appellants shall bear the costs of the appeal.
FACTS AND REASONS
I.

REQUESTS OF THE PARTIES
1. Appellants
(1) Overturn the district court's decision.
(2) Requests of appellants A, B, C, and D (hereinafter collectively
“Appellant A”)20

17
The Sapporo District Court in Naganuma held that the SDF missile site at issue would be a “first
target” of attack from a foreign country in times of emergency, violating the plaintiffs’ right to live in
peace. Naganuma DC, supra note 15, at 65.
18
See, e.g., Higashi v. Nakasōne, 1336 HANREI JIHŌ 45, 81 (Osaka Dist. Ct., Nov. 9, 1989)
(challenging an official visit by Prime Minister Nakasōne to Yasukuni Shrine); Hashimoto v. Ōta, 47(3)
GYŌSAI REISHŪ 192, 273-75, 1563 HANREI JIHŌ 26, 53-54 (Fukuoka High Ct., Mar. 25, 1996), available at
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/0338002D010B9F4149256D41000A793E.pdf (challenging an order of
the Prime Minister allowing the U.S. military to continue operation of the Futenma Air Base in Okinawa);
Aoki v. Japan, 1577 HANREI JIHŌ 104, 118 (Osaka Dist. Ct., Mar. 27, 1996) (challenging the deployment of
a maritime minesweeper unit to the Persian Gulf and the donation of $9 billion to the Gulf Peace Fund);
Aihara v. Japan, 1619 HANREI JIHŌ 45, 50 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Mar. 12, 1997) (challenging the deployment of
the SDF to Cambodia to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations).
19
Okayama
District
Court,
Feb.
24,
2009
(unpublished
decision),
http://www.tkclex.ne.jp/commentary/zn/zn25450745.html (last visited May 22, 2010). See Nagayama
Shigeki, Jieitai no Iraku Hahei to Heiwateki Seizonken no Shingai [Iraq Deployment of the SDF and
Violation of the Right to Live in Peace], 654 HŌGAKU SEMINA 126 (2009) (commenting on the Okayama
District Court decision).
20
Translator’s note: Japanese courts often use letters in place of party names for privacy concerns.
“Appellant A” is Mōri Masamichi, a Japanese attorney who also represented another group of plaintiffs in a
similar SDF Iraq Deployment case in Kōfu District Court. MŌRI MASAMICHI, supra note 1, at 195. See
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A. Appellee must not deploy the Self-Defense Forces (“SDF”)
under the Act on Special Measures Concerning the
Implementation of Humanitarian Reconstruction Support
Activities and Support Activities Maintaining Security in Iraq
(hereinafter “Iraq Special Measures Act”) 21 to Iraq, its
surrounding areas and waters.
B. Confirm that appellee’s deployment of the SDF to Iraq and the
neighboring areas under the Iraq Special Measures Act is
unconstitutional.
(3) Request of all appellants: that appellee pays each appellant
¥10,000.
(4) Appellee bears the costs of appeal for parts I and II.
2. Appellee: requests the same as the judgment.
II.

SUMMARY OF THE CASE
1. In this case, the appellants, who claim that the deployment of the SDF
to Iraq and its surrounding areas based on the Iraq Special Measures
Act (hereinafter “Deployment.” In addition, the Republic of Iraq and
its surrounding areas will hereinafter be referred to as “Iraq.”) is
unconstitutional, claim that their right to live in peace, including “the
right to live in a Japan that does not engage in war or the use of
military force” (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “right to live
in peace”) was violated by this Deployment, and based on the State
Redress Act (Article 1(1)), each individually seeks ¥10,000 in
damages (hereinafter “Request for Damages”), an injunction against a
Deployment of Appellant A (hereinafter “Request for Injunction”), as
well as a confirmation that the Deployment is unconstitutional for
violating Article 9 of the Constitution (hereinafter “Request for
Confirmation of Unconstitutionality”). After the lower court rejected
Appellant A’s claims for a Request for Injunction and a Request for
Confirmation of Unconstitutionality as improper, and dismissed
appellants’ Request for Damages, appellants appealed.

[SDF Iraq Deployment Case], 1194 HANREI TAIMUZU 117 (Kōfu Dist. Ct., Oct. 25, 2005), available at
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20060811180117.pdf.
21
Translator’s note: the Iraq Special Measures Act is available in Japanese at Iraku ni okeru Jindō
Fukkō Shien Katsudō oyobi Anzen Kakuho Shien Katsudō no Jisshi ni kansuru Tokubetsu Sochi Sō [Act
on Special Measures Concerning the Implementation of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Support
Activities and Support Activities Ensuring Safety in Iraq], Law No. 137 of 2003 (revised by Law No. 101
of 2007), available at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H15/H15HO137.html.
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2. Given Facts (public knowledge and facts evident to this court)
(1) On July 26, 2003, during the 156th session of the Diet, the Iraq
Special Measures Act (Act No. 137 of 2003) was approved for a
period of four years, and on August 1st of the same year was
promulgated and went into effect.
(2) On December 9, 2003, the cabinet decided on a basic plan under
this Act (hereinafter simply “Basic Plan”) regarding the
humanitarian reconstruction support activities and support
activities maintaining security (hereinafter “Response
Measures”).
(3) The Director General of the Defense Agency (prior to the
revision under Act No. 118 of Dec. 2006; same below), 22
following the Basic Plan, established deployment guidelines for
the contribution of service by the SDF to be carried out as
Response Measures, and after receiving approval for these
deployment guidelines from the Prime Minister issued a
mobilization order to the SDF, as well as a deployment order to
the Air SDF advance unit. The Director General deployed the
Air SDF advance unit to Iraq and the State of Kuwait (hereinafter
“Kuwait”) from December 26, and later issued a deployment
order to the Ground SDF, deploying them from January 16, 2004
to Samawah in the Al Muthanna Governorate in southern Iraq.
(4) The Ground SDF completely withdrew from Samawah on July 17,
2006. However, the Air SDF continues air transport activities of
supplies and personnel from Kuwait to Baghdad, the capital of
Iraq (a cabinet order partially changed the Basic Plan in August
of 2006).
(5) On June 20, 2007, during the 166th session of the Diet, the Iraq
Special Measures Reform Act (Act No. 101 of 2007) was passed,
which extended the SDF deployment to Iraq by 2 years, and the
Air SDF to this day continues to conduct air transport activities.
3. Claims of the Parties: see attachment.
III.

DECISION OF THIS COURT
1. For the following reasons, this court holds that Appellant A’s Request
for Confirmation of Unconstitutionality and Request for Injunction
22

Translator’s note: The Japan Defense Agency was upgraded to a Ministry on January 9, 2007.
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are improper and must be rejected, and appellants’ Request for
Damages must be dismissed.
2. Regarding the Unconstitutionality of the Deployment
(1) Certified Facts. The following facts, synthesized from public
knowledge, facts evident from this trial, evidence (officially
recorded in each section), and the overall effect of the arguments,
are recognized.
***
[translator’s note: the court’s description of the situation in Iraq is omitted]
***
(2) The Iraq Special Measures Act and the Government’s
Interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution
1. The government’s interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution
in relation to overseas activities of the SDF is that the
minimum use of military force necessary for self-defense is
permitted (written answer of the government of Dec. 5, 1980).
Given that the use of military force is an act of combat linked
to an international military conflict using Japanese physical or
human organizations (answer of the government submitted by
the House of Representatives Special Committee on
Peacekeeping Operations on September 27, 1991), overseas
activities of the SDF consist of the following:
i. an “overseas military deployment” for the purpose of using
military force is not permitted, but an “overseas
deployment” not for the purpose of using military force is
permitted (written answer of the government of October 28,
1980);
ii. cooperation that does not constitute participation in the use
of military force by another country (such as transporting,
supplying, or medical care) is nevertheless evaluated as our
use of military force when such cooperation is integrated
with the use of force by that country and is thus not
permitted under the Constitution, however cooperation that
is not integrated with the use of military force of another
country is permitted (answer of Cabinet Legislation Bureau
Director-General Ōmori in the House of Representatives
Budget Committee on February 13, 1997); and
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iii. whether such cooperation is integrated with the use of
military force by another country is determined on a caseby-case basis by comprehensively considering various
factors such as (a) the geographical relationship between the
site of the relevant activities and the place where the combat
activities are taking place or are planned to take place, (b)
the specific content of the relevant activities, and (c) the
current state of the activities of the party we are attempting
to cooperate with (answer of Cabinet Legislation Bureau
Director-General Ōmori, supra).
2. Under this government interpretation, the Iraq Special
Measures Act can be understood to provide that our country
shall conduct humanitarian reconstruction support activities
and support activities maintaining security (hereinafter
“Response Measures”) (Article 1), the implementation of
which must not constitute the threat or use of military force
(Article 2(2)), and such Response Measures shall only be
conducted inside Japan and in designated areas where it is
recognized that no acts of combat (acts of killing or destruction
linked to an international military conflict) are being conducted,
nor will any such act of combat be conducted for the duration
of the activities (non-combat areas) (Article 2(3)).
3. The government expresses the following viewpoints: an
“international military conflict” as mentioned herein is a
conflict between countries or country-like organizations using
military force that goes beyond the internal problems of one
country (answer of Defense Agency Director-General Ishiba in
the House of Representatives Special Committee of June 26,
2003); the existence of an act of combat should be individually
and specifically decided in response to the realities of the
corresponding act, including its internationality, planning,
organization, and continuity (answer of Defense Agency
Director-General Ishiba in the House of Representatives
Special Committee of July 7, 2003); although not all uses of
force by the U.S. and British military against criminal
organizations are considered uses of force in a military conflict
under international law (answer of Cabinet Legislation Bureau
Second Department Director-General G in the House of
Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee of June 13, 2003;
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answers of Cabinet Legislation Bureau Director-General
Akiyama in the House of Representatives Iraq Special
Committee of July 2, 2003 and in the House of Councillors
Diplomacy and Defense Committee of July 10, 2003), if it is
determined, in individual and specific cases, that the subject of
such acts has a defined political cause, and such subject is an
organization with military capability or with the capability of
becoming a party to an international conflict, and destructive
activities are being conducted by such subject based on its
political cause, then such acts can be considered to be by a
country-like organization (answer of Cabinet Legislation
Bureau Director-General Akiyama, supra); acts where the
organization, planning, or continuity are unclear, such as
terrorist acts limited to domestic security problems, sporadic
gunfire, or small-scale attacks are not recognized as being
executed based on the will of a country or a country-like
organization, and thus do not constitute acts of combat; as a
concrete example of a country or a country-like organization, if
remnants of the Hussein regime were continuing to oppose the
U.S. and British military with the aim of restoring the Hussein
regime, then this would constitute an act of combat, however if
such an organization, even though they were remnants of the
Hussein regime, were merely looting to procure provisions for
daily life, then this would not constitute an act of combat
(answer of Defense Agency Director-General Ishiba in the
House of Representatives Special Committee on July 2, 2003);
non-combat areas do not necessarily mean safe areas, and
“combat zones” as designated by the U.S. military are not
synonymous with combat areas (answer of Defense Agency
Director-General Ishiba in the House of Representatives
Special Committee of June 25, 2003; answer of Foreign Affairs
Minister Asō in the House of Representatives Special
Committee of August 11, 2006).
(3) Given the above investigation, and according to the preceding
certified facts, even after the declaration by President Bush of the
end of major combat operations in May of 2003, the multinational force, centered around the U.S. military, mobilized many
troops in the cities of Fallujah, Baghdad, and Ramadi, repeatedly
conducting search-and-destroy missions for armed insurgent
groups, at times using powerful bombs, chemical weapons,
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inhumane weapons, or violent aerial bombardments. Armed
insurgents fought back using commensurate force, at times using
weapons that rivaled those of the multi-national force, and the
result was grave and terrible suffering with many deaths on both
sides, many civilians killed including children, homes destroyed,
city functions lost, and many people forced to become refugees
and migrate to neighboring countries. The insurgent groups who
are the target of these search-and-destroy missions, including
remnants of the Hussein regime, the Shiite Mahdi army, and
Sunni extremists, are not merely groups conducting sporadic
gunfire and small-scale attacks, nor can they be called criminal
groups of thieves looting to procure provisions for daily life.
Although the full reality is unclear, each receives aid from
overseas powers, and while receiving this support, with the
defined political goal of opposing the stationing of the U.S.
military, they maintain considerable military force, with members
in the thousands or tens-of-thousands and increasing each year,
and they conduct organized and planned resistance to the multinational force, continuing their resistance five years after the start
of the Iraq offensive. Therefore, the activities of the multinational force to suppress this resistance exceed simple security
activities, and at least at present, inside Iraq, in addition to the
conflict between insurgent groups rooted in the religious
opposition that arose after the end of the Iraq offensive, there is
conflict between insurgent groups and the multi-national force,
and all this can be called an entwined and bogged down state of
war. This is also clear in light of the fact that the U.S. military
has for these five years regularly stationed 130,000 to 160,000
military personnel in Iraq, spending more than it did in the
Vietnam War, and although this includes damage from sporadic
and unorganized suicide bombings, many deaths continue on both
sides, without a satisfactory recovery of security.
From the above it can be said that at present in Iraq an
international military conflict is being conducted between the
multi-national force and insurgent groups who from their
substance can be recognized as country-like organizations, and it
is a dispute using military force that goes beyond the internal
security problems of a single country. Above all, the capital
Baghdad, even in 2007, is an area where victims from both sides
as well as average citizens continue to be killed, with the U.S.
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military expanding its many search-and-destroy missions
targeting Shiite and Sunni insurgent groups, and the insurgent
groups resisting with commensurate force. This is truly an area
where acts of killing and destruction linked to an international
military conflict are being conducted, and can thus be recognized
as a “combat area” under the Iraq Special Measures Act.
Still, even if the stationing of the multi-national force in Iraq
and its combat with insurgent groups is based on the request of
the Iraqi government with the understanding and support of the
United Nations (Security Council Decision Nos. 1483, 1546), in
light of the fact that the Iraq offensive which began in March of
2003 and the disorder from the religious opposition that the
offensive brought about has yet to be resolved, and the fact that
the Iraqi government gained the support of the multi-national
force made up of foreign troops because at present it cannot
oppose these insurgent groups alone, it can be said that the
conflict inside Iraq between the multi-national force and the
insurgent groups is substantively an extension of the first Iraq
offensive, and is an international conflict between the foreign
multi-national force and the Iraq domestic insurgent groups.
Even seen from this point, the present condition of combat is that
of an international conflict.
Although the details are unclear as the government has not
disclosed them to the Diet or the people, the following facts can
be recognized: the Air SDF, as certified above, has conducted air
transport activities to Baghdad airport since around July of 2006,
regularly transporting armed military personnel of the multinational force four or five times per week from Ali Al Salem
airport to Baghdad airport using three C-130H transport aircraft
developed by the U.S. for transporting paratroopers; this is being
done at the request of the U.S. after the Ground SDF withdrew
from Samawah, and the U.S. military reinforced U.S. troops in
Baghdad during this same transport period in around August of
2006, intensifying its search-and-destroy missions in Baghdad
from around the end of that year; prior air transport activities
were coordinated and planned by the U.S. and British militaries
in the U.S. Central Command in Qatar, and it is inferred that air
transport activities since July of 2006 have been conducted under
the coordination of the U.S. military as well; C-130H transport
aircraft are equipped with flares to defend against attacks from
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surface-to-air missiles, and these flares, after completing prior
training, are actually being used during takeoff and landing at
Baghdad airport; the Defense Minister has answered to the effect
that even though the U.S. military is tightly defending Baghdad
airport, there is a real danger of attack both inside the airport and
during takeoff and landing; and there is no evidence that, when
the Air SDF transports armed personnel of the multi-national
force, the personnel are limited to those not related to the use of
military force in search-and-destroy missions in Baghdad. Taken
together, it can be said that the air transport activities of the Air
SDF are mainly being conducted in the name of support activities
maintaining security under the Iraq Special Measures Act, and
even assuming this in itself does not constitute the use of military
force, the Air SDF is regularly and certainly transporting armed
military personnel of the multi-national force, who can be
inferred to include anti-insurgent combatants, under the close
coordination of the multi-national force and in places
geographically close to areas where acts of combat between the
multi-national force and insurgent groups are taking place.
Considering the fact that in modern warfare supplying activities
such as transport are an important element of acts of combat
(B141, point of appellant’s argument), it can be said that the Air
SDF is conducting military logistical support that is indispensible
to the acts of combat of the multi-national force. Therefore, such
air transport activities of the Air SDF, at least in regards to
transporting armed military personnel of the multi-national force
to Baghdad, in light of the answer of Cabinet Legislation Bureau
Director-General Ōmori of February 13, 1997, are integrated with
the use of military force by another country, and must be
evaluated as our use of military force as well.
(4) Therefore, the air transport activities of the Air SDF presently
being carried out in Iraq, under the same interpretation of the
Constitution as the government, even assuming the Iraq Special
Measures Act is constitutional, include activities that violate
Article 2(2) of the Iraq Special Measure Act prohibiting the use
of military force, Article 2(3) limiting the area of activities to
non-combat areas, and furthermore, Article 9(1) of the
Constitution.
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3. The Right to Live in Peace upon which the Request for Injunction is
Based
The right to live in peace, expressed in the Preamble of the
Constitution as “the right to live in peace,” 23 is defined as, for
example, “the fundamental human right to live in peace, free from
fear and want, uninfringed and unrestricted due to destruction
resulting from war, armaments or war preparation, with the essence of
a natural right in the nuclear age that can create a peaceful country
and world,” and is an extremely diverse and broad right, as shown by
the differing expressions advocated by the appellants, including “the
right to live in a Japan that does not engage in war or the use of
military force,” “the right to not contribute to the taking of the life of
another through war or the military,” “the right to live in peace based
on one’s peaceful convictions, and not be involved with damaging
acts by military measures against the people of another country,” and
“the right to live and stand against war, against violence, and for
pacifism, aspiring to peace based on faith, and pursuing the happiness
of all people.”
From the fact that the fundamental human rights presently
guaranteed by the Constitution could not exist without a foundation of
peace, the right to live in peace can be called a foundational right at
the base of all fundamental human rights making their enjoyment
possible, and goes beyond a simple expression of the basic spirit or
idea of the Constitution. From the fact that the Preamble of the
Constitution, which must be said to have legal normative character,24
famously expresses “the right to live in peace,” and in addition Article
9 of the Constitution provides for the renunciation of war and
23
Translator’s note: The court refers to heiwateki seizonken [literally “the right to a peaceful
existence”] and to heiwa no uchi ni seizon suru kenri [the right to live in peace]. There is no difference in
meaning between the two terms, and both translate to “the right to live in peace.” See supra text
accompanying note 4.
24
Translator’s note: Legal normative character [hō kihansei] refers to a provision’s nature as a legal
norm [hō kihan]. Constitutional provisions in Japan are classified as either “legal norms” [hō kihan] or
“judicial norms” [saiban kihan] depending on their legal effect. A legal norm is a provision that can be
used to interpret another provision; it is a broad term that encompasses all provisions of the Constitution,
including the Preamble. A judicial norm is a provision that can be relied on independently to determine the
constitutionality of a law or order in an exercise of constitutional review. A judicial norm must have
sufficiently definite, or “concrete” [gutaiteki] substance to provide a standard for judicial decision-making.
In the context of human rights provisions, a judicial norm corresponds to a “concrete right” [gutaiteki
kenri]. A provision that lacks concreteness is characterized as “abstract” [chūshōteki] and does not rise to a
judicial norm. See KOBAYASHI, supra note 4, at 34-39. The distinction between concrete and abstract
rights reflects the broader political meaning of the term “right” [kenri] in the Japanese language, implying
more than a legally enforceable duty. See FELDMAN, supra note 3, at 1-15.
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prohibits the maintenance of war potential as an objective system
from the side of government action, and furthermore, Chapter III of
the Constitution, beginning with the personal rights provided for in
Article 13, provides for individual fundamental human rights, the
right to live in peace must be recognized as a legal right under the
Constitution. The right to live in peace can be called a compound
right that can be expressed as a freedom right, a social right, or a
political right, depending on the circumstances, and there are
situations where its character as a concrete right can be affirmed,
meaning its protection and relief can be requested through invoking
legal enforcement measures in a court of law. For example, if, due to
acts of state that violate Article 9 of the Constitution, in other words
the execution of war, the use of military force, or acts of military
preparation, an individual’s life or freedom are infringed or threatened
with being infringed, or if an individual is forced to contribute to or
cooperate with the execution of war in violation of Article 9, then
mainly as a manifestation of the freedom right aspect of the right to
live in peace, it can be interpreted that there are situations where relief
can be sought in a court of law through such methods as a request for
injunction against the unconstitutional act or a request for damages,
and to that extent the right to live in peace has the character of a
concrete right.
Still, there is a point of view denying the possibility of
characterizing the right to live in peace as a right, or a concrete right,
based on the fact that “peace” is an abstract concept, and that there are
so many ways to define and achieve peace, however constitutional
concepts are generally abstract, and filled in by interpretation. For
example, even “freedom” and “equality” have many ways of
achievement, and there is no reason to single out the right to live in
peace and deny it the possibility of being characterized as a legal right
or a concrete right because the concept of peace is abstract.
4. Requests of the Appellants
(1) Appellant A’s Request for Confirmation of Unconstitutionality
Because the system of civil litigation seeks to settle disputes
between parties involving present rights or legal relationships,
the target of a confirmation must be a present right or legal
relationship.
However, this Request for Confirmation of
Unconstitutionality seeks to confirm that an actual act is
abstractly unconstitutional, and does not involve a present right
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or legal relationship, so this request is improper for lacking a
confirmation interest.
(2) Appellant A’s Request for Injunction
1. Legality as a Civil Action
The Iraq Special Measures Act provides for the following
specific procedures for implementing Response Measures: (i)
the Prime Minister seeks a cabinet decision for implementation
of Response Measures and a Basic Plan proposal (Article 4(1),
same for changes to the Basic Plan, Article 4(3)); (ii) the Prime
Minister must seek approval from the Diet for the Response
Measures (Article 6(1)); (iii) the Defense Minister establishes
the implementation guidelines for the Response Measures, and
after receiving approval from the Prime Minister, orders SDF
units to implement them (Article 8(2), same for changes to the
implementation guidelines, Article 8(9)). From these provisions,
the deployment of the SDF to Iraq under the Iraq Special
Measures Act is essentially a use of governmental authority
under the administrative power granted to the Defense Minister
based on the provisions of the Iraq Special Measures Act, so the
Request for Injunction seeking to prohibit the Deployment
necessarily includes a request seeking the cancellation or
invocation of the Defense Minister's use of the aforementioned
administrative power. Thus, because precedent has established
that private citizens do not have the right to request civil
remedies for such uses of administrative power (see, e.g.,
Supreme Court, Grand Bench, Decision of Dec. 16, 1981,
Minshū vol. 35, no. 10, p. 1369), the Request for Injunction is
improper.
2. Legality as an Administrative Appeal (kōkoku appeal)
Therefore, we will consider the Request for Injunction as
though it were filed as an administrative appeal (kōkoku appeal).
The Deployment, as stated above, includes illegal and
unconstitutional activities, and according to the overall effect of
the relevant evidence and arguments, has greatly impacted
Appellant A. However, the Deployment was not directed at
Appellant A, nor was Appellant A’s life or freedom infringed or
endangered, nor was Appellant A injured or put in fear of actual
war, nor did events come to forcing Appellant A to contribute to
or cooperate in an execution of war that violates Article 9 of the
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Constitution, and from all the evidence, at present, it cannot be
recognized to have violated Appellant A’s right to live in peace
as a concrete right. Thus, Appellant A does not have a legal
interest in seeking the cancellation of the Defense Minister’s
order, and does not have standing for an administrative appeal
(kōkoku appeal). Therefore, even assuming the Request for
Injunction was claimed as an administrative appeal (kōkoku
appeal), we cannot escape concluding it is improper.
(3) Appellants’ Request for Damages
According to the overall effect of the relevant evidence and
arguments, appellants each have a strong faith and belief in peace
backed up by serious life experiences, and they bring this
Request for Damages for the mental anguish they have suffered
due to the Deployment that includes violations of Article 9 of the
Constitution. These compelling sentiments include many parts
that must be sympathized with as Japanese citizens under the
pacifist Constitution, and should not be regarded as no more than
the personal indignation of political losers under an indirect
democracy, as discomfort, or as frustration.
However, as stated above regarding Appellant A’s Request for
Injunction, the Deployment cannot be recognized to have gone as
far as violating appellants’ right to live in peace as a concrete
right, and we cannot recognize that a violation of appellants’
interests sufficient to sustain a request for damages in a civil
action has yet occurred. Therefore, we cannot recognize
appellants’ Request for Damages.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As stated above, we hold that the decision of the lower court was proper,
and this appeal is dismissed.
Nagoya High Court, Third Civil Division
Chief Judge AOYAMA, Kunio
Judge TSUBOI, Nobuyuki
Judge UESUGI, Eiji

